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Comment

LIABILITY OF THE OWNER OF AN AIRCRAFT
UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
WILLIAM

D. ELLIOTT

The trend in aviation litigation reveals an attempt to hold the
owner of a private aircraft vicariously liable in aviation wrongful
death cases. The desire to have the suits litigated in a federal forum
has occurred, in part, because of the variousness of state remedies
and the belief that justice demands uniform recoveries. Accordingly, plaintiffs have attempted to persuade the federal judiciary to
fashion a federal common law of aviation torts to hold the nonnegligent aircraft owner vicariously liable for the negligence of the
pilot. Attention has therefore been focused on the power of the
federal courts to fashion a federal common law of aviation torts.
This inquiry into the distribution of power between the federal
and state judicial systems goes to the heart of federalism and is
fraught with dangers. Because of the delicate problems of federalstate relations, the courts should demonstrate a true understanding
of the historical basis of the federal system and illuminate a clear
path for future courts to follow. The courts should avoid the alluring temptation to use misleading dicta or cliches from earlier
precedent to support a result. In addition, opinions should fully
explain their deliberation and rational choice. Unfortunately, the
courts have allowed the path to become overgrown with misleading
notions of implied cause of action and federal preemption. This
comment will attempt to clear away some of the underbrush by
suggesting an approach to the problem of whether the federal courts
should create a federal common law of aviation torts in general, and
specifically whether federal or state law should govern the liability
of owners of private aircraft. With respect to vicarious liability of
aircraft owners, federal judicial lawmaking in aviation tort suits
is inconsistent with principles circumscribing the lawmaking powers
of the federal judiciary.
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I.

LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF AIRCRAFT

"There is a strong and growing tendency . . . to ask, in view of the
exigencies of social justice, who can
best bear the loss.'
A. Historical Basis
The federal government is one of limited authority;' the colonies
delegated only specified portions of the sovereignty they possessed to
the national government.! Consequently, the states are the source
and arbiter of the rights and obligations that govern day-to-day
relations except when the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States otherwise require.'
Furthermore, the federal judiciary was conceived as an organ of
limited powers within a government of limited powers.' The limited
role of the federal judiciary, however, is rooted deeper than even
the separation of powers doctrine because the national powers are
exercised "against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states . . .
Although it has been argued that the Constitution established
a broad charter that conferred authority on the federal courts to
decide controversies without reference to state law, certain areas
are not within the concern of the federal judiciary. Accordingly,
there has been much discussion over the years in an attempt to
delineate more clearly those areas in which the federal judiciary is
permitted to legislate without trespassing onto the areas of traditional state responsibility. In general, the lawmaking powers of
1

R.

POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

189 (1921).

'H. Hart & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
436 (1953). [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

I United States v. Spraque, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931); Note, The Competence
of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085

(1964).
4Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970); Note, The Competence of
the Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084
(1964).
'See note 3 supra.
'HART

& WECHSLER

435.

Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision-More on the Erie Case, 30 Ky. L.J.
1, 20-33 (1941) (e.g. diversity and admiralty).
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the federal courts8 are limited by the perimeters of the separation

of powers doctrine.!
One of the more important cases articulating the role of the
federal courts vis-a-vis the state courts is Erie R.R. v. Tompkins."
Erie's implication is that certain matters are beyond the lawmaking

competence of the federal judiciary. Although the case limited the
power of federal courts to fashion a federal common law,' the

federal common law has continued to expand into areas traditionally and historically thought to be solely within the bounds of state
courts.12 The generally articulated theory has been that the federal
I "There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would
then be the legislator. Were it joined with the executive power the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor." 1 B. MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIT
OF THE LAws 216 (3d ed. 1898).
' When the framers of the Constitution established the three separate branches
of government in the first three articles, the reasons were several: prevent abuses
of authority; provide a means of achieving that purpose by creating checks and
balances; and as an institution, the concept of separation of powers had to be integrated with many other elements to make the federal government. The nature
of these aspects, however, was not clearly or consistently conceived by the framers and clarification and delineation was a necessary element of the growth of
the institution. Thus there are two areas of potential conflict; between the judicial
and legislative and between the federal and state judicial systems.
10304 U.S. 64 (1938).

11"Federal law is generally insterstital in nature. It rarely occupies a legal
field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the
states." HART & WECHSLER 435.
"Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent.
This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory
codes, and is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself." D'Oench Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
"[T]he law's capacity for growth . . . must include the creative work of

judges .... " United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947).
12A partial list of the areas in which federal common law has delved includes:
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (standard of conduct
of directors of registered investment company is a matter of federal law); Kohler
v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (conduct of insider as violating
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) or Rule
X-10b(5) of the S.E.C., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) is a matter of federal
law); Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d
Cir. 1958) (validity, ownership and infringement of registered trademarks under
the Lantham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970) are governed by federal law);
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (patents and controversies are
governed by the federal common law); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell,
Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (use of false description or representation of
goods in commerce is governed by federal law); Postal Tel-Cable Co. v. WarrenGodwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919) (authorization to telegraph companies
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judicial lawmaking authority has survived Erie in those limited
areas in which the presence of federal concerns necessitate application of federal decisional law.13
Unfortunately, the courts have inadequately articulated the analysis in the area of federal-state relations. As a result, courts have
subsequently seized upon loose dicta as controlling. These inadequately reasoned opinions fail to furnish a guide for future courts
to help them decide whether there is a sufficient federal concern to
to establish different rates for repeated and unrepeated messages is governed by
federal law); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940)
(liability for failure to transmit a telegraph message plus transmission of defamatory one is governed by federal law); Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 320 U.S. 508 (1944) (federal law governs interpretation of bill of lading
prescribed by ICC); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1971) (waste discharge from nuclear reactor plant is governed by
federal law); noted in 13 Bos. COL. IND. & C.L. REV. 813 (1972); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (collective bargaining is governed by the
federal common law); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)
(commercial paper issued by the federal government is governed by federal law);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (international law
is governed by federal common law).
In addition, it has been urged that the entire field of securities regulation
be governed by federal law, 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 90-105 (1961).
But because the federal courts draw their law from many areas, when federal
common law is imposed into a new area, there are great initial difficulties in discovering what the content of the law will be. For example, the federal courts
build their common law from: (i) the old pre-Erie federal common law; National
Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 457 (1945); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1938); (ii) "considerations of equity
and convenience," Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51
(1939); (iii) "principles of established credit in jurisprudence;" D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J. concurring); (iv) general
contract law; Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947);
United States v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 366 F.2d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 1966); or,
(v) on principles drawn from an array of state and federal sources; see O'Brien
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1940). Thus the federal
common law will be uncertain and almost impossible to predict.
"See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 422 (1964). The "new" federal common law,
emerging since Erie differs from the "general" common law applied under Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). First, the new federal common law completely preempts state statutory, constitutional and decisional law. See Hinderlider
v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Under Swift's "general" common law, federal courts were bound to apply statutes, when applicable.
Second, federal law, that is applied through the vehicle of the "new" federal
common law, governs whether the controversy is raised in state or federal courts.
See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hill]. Thus, since
the "new" federal common law completely ousts the state law, it is incumbent to
give restrictive interpretation to it. Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate
Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1444 n.16 (1972).
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warrant application of the federal common law. Some of the postErie techniques used by the Supreme Court to create a federal
common law are: (i) the implication of a private cause of action
from a statute intended to provide other sanctions; (ii) a spontaneous generation as in the case of interstate controversies or
government contracts; (iii) a construction of a jurisdictional grant
as a command to fashion federal law; and (iv) the normal filling of
statutory interstices." These decisions do not mesh into a logical
pattern; they are not unlike nebulae, floating in the celestial sea of
the federal common law. 5
This confusion could be avoided, or at least minimized, if the
courts, when deciding whether federal or state law should be used,
would presume that state law controls. An affirmative showing that
the application of federal law is consistent with the nature of the
federal system should be required before the state law presumption
could be rebutted.
B. The Search for Solvent Defendants
The impetus behind recent developments in aviation tort litigation has been a desire on the part of plaintiffs to litigate in a federal
forum thereby avoiding state courts. To understand this desire it is
necessary to analyze the state remedies for holding the owner of
an aircraft vicariously liable.
The notion that the owner of the aircraft should respond in
damages to persons injured through the fault or negligence of the
pilot has its roots in the common law principle that a master
should be compelled to respond in damages for injuries resulting
from the negligent acts of his servant committed in the course of
employment." Through the years the courts have modified various
14Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39

N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 421 (1964).
15"If there were .

.

. a transcendental body of law outside of any particular

State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of
the United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what
it was. But there is no such body of law." Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1928)
(Holmes, J.).
6
" Durso v. A.D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941); Psota
v. Long Island R.R., 246 N.Y. 388, 159 N.E. 180 (1927); See Laski, The Basis
of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 108 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Laski];
See generally, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-74 (4th ed. 1971) [here-

inafter cited as PROSSER].
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aspects of a master's liability by gradually and deliberately expanding the principle of respondeat superior to include wilful
torts;" in addition they have included a large number of solvent
defendants.18 These modifications have been made with a view
towards illuminating the "nebulous concepts underlying the doctrine
that in some instances an individual, himself innocent, must make
amends for another's torts. "' 1
Although many theories have been advanced to explain the basis
for the master's vicarious liability" ". . . the true basis of vicarious
liability is... not... the irksome fiction of identity, but rather...
what is socially desirable and expedient."'" Consequently, the courts
in "deliberately allocating the risk" have reasoned that the loss
should be placed on the one most able to bear it.2
Throughout the evolution of modem transportation, the view
has developed that the owner of the particular mode of transportation system should bear the responsibility for damages arising out
of its negligent operation because that owner ". . . may spread the
risk [of liability] through insurance and carry the cost thereof as
part of the costs of doing business."2 This postulate is the underpinning of "the deep pocket theory."
"'Doyle v. Cleaning Co., 31 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. App. 1930) noted in 44

HARV.

L. REV. 642 (1931).
" Note, Vicarious Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, 45 HARV. L.
REV.

171 (1931).

19Id.

20Many of the early theories covered a broad range of ideas: (i) "formulation
of identity" (Holmes), (ii) someone ought to respond for the damages caused
(Baty), (iii) hold the master liable, then he would be more careful in the selection of his servants (Pothier), (iv) master is liable because of a failure of him
to do his own work (Bacon), and (v) the master set the forces in motion (Lord
Brougham). Id.
The more contemporary theories are: (i) the master has fictitious control
over the behavior of the servant, (ii) the master "set the whole thing in motion," and is responsible for what happened, (iii) the master selected the servant
and should therefore suffer for the servant's wrongs rather than innocent strangers
who had no opportunity to protect themselves. PROSSER § 69 at 459.
21 Note,

REV.

Vicarious Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, 45 HARV. L.

171, 175 (1931).

22PROSSER at 459; BATY, VicARious LIABILITY 154 (1916). The master is
responsible for his employee "because in a social distribution of profit and loss,
the balance of least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained." See note 16
supra citing Laski; Cf. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 330 (1929);
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456 (1923).
2
Johnson v.Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 55, 181 P.2d 645, 651 (1947) (Traynor,
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One mode of transportation, the automobile, has significantly
contributed to the explosive development of vicarious liability tort

principles. Drawing from the common law, the principle was early
established that the owner was held liable for the negligent control
of an automobile only if the servant was operating it in the course
of employment."4 This principle has been both the genesis and the
guide for courts to create fictions expanding the responsibility of
automobile owners.' Some of the more common fictions employed
have been: (i) owner's right of control of the operation of the

automobile creates an agency relationship," (ii) automobile is a
dangerous instrumentality," and (iii) a presumption that the driver
is the servant of the owner." These artificial bridges, however, are at

best merely rationalizations for "what is socially desirable and expedient" in "the search for the deeper pocket."
Similar fictions have been relied on by courts in placing the responsibility for damages arising out of the operation of the aircraft
upon the owner.29 Looking to the common law, the courts, as in the

automobile cases, developed the principle that vicarious liability of
an aircraft owner cannot be imposed absent a master/servant or

principal/agent relationship between the owner and the operator of
24

Beeville v. Taylor, 202 Ala. 305, 80 So. 370 (1918); Durso v. A.D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941); Halverson v. Blosser, 101 Kan.
683, 168 P. 863 (1917), noted in 33 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1920); Jennings v.
Campbell, 142 Neb. 354, 6 N.W.2d 376 (1942); Fallon v. Swackhamer, 226
N.Y. 444, 123 N.E. 737 (1919); Psota v. Long Island R.R., 246 N.Y. 388, 159
N.E. 180 (1927); Dunmore v. Padden, 262 Pa. 436, 105 A. 559 (1918); Jarvis
v. Wallace, 139 Va. 171, 123 S.E. 374 (1924).
'2 Typical of these fictions is the "family purpose doctrine," wherein the head
of the family, who maintains an automobile for the general use, pleasure and
convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of another family member
having the authority to drive the vehicle. The doctrine is based on grounds of
public policy. Jennings v. Campbell, 142 Neb. 354, 6 N.W.2d 376 (1942); Steele
v. Age's Admr., 223 Ky. 714, 26 S.W.2d 563 (1930), noted in 21 Ky. L.J. 483
(1930); Turner v. Hall's Admr., 252 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky. 1952); see also Note,
5 N.C.L. REv. 253 (1927). For a list of the states accepting and rejecting this
doctrine see 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433(1) at 961 nn.71, 72. See also PRosSER § 73 at 483.
26Cf. Wheeler v. Darmochwat, 280 Mass. 553, 183 N.E. 55 (1932); Powers
v. State for Use of Reynolds, 178 Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909 (1940).
2
1 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 692 (1920).
"Heaviln v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 241 N.W. 654 (1932); see also Note, 25
ST. JOHNS L. REV. 306 (1951).
29 See generally Wolff, Liability of Aircraft Owners and Operators for Ground
Injury, 24 J. AIR L. & CoM. 203 (1957).
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the aircraft3 ° because aircraft ownership is insufficient to predicate
liability for injuries caused by the negligence of the operator.
The prominent theory employed both by courts and legislatures
during the infancy of aviation was that aviation was an ultrahazardous activity. As a result, strict liability was imposed upon
aircraft owners." The courts compared aviation liability to the
liability laws in the early days of the horseless carriage and required
that all those who participated observe the highest degree of care. 3
For obvious reasons of advancing technology leading to greater
safety, the notion of aviation as being ultrahazardous has diminished
in modem times.34 Consequently, the weight of authority recognizes
30 D'Aguilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Brewer v. Thomoson, 215 Ark. 164, 219 S.W.2d 758 (1949); Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp.,
103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d
641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Broyles v. Jess, 201 Cal. App. 2d 841, 20 Cal. Rptr.
355 (1962); Southern Air Transp. v. Gulf Airways, Inc., 215 La. 366, 50 So. 2d
787 (1949); Haskin v. North East Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d
81 (1963); Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service, Inc., 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560
(1949); Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096 (1938).
31"Aviation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous because even
the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so incapable of complete control
that flying creates a risk that the plane even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated, may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels
on the land over which flight is made." 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938),
Comment b; Cf. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954); D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335, 337
(4th Cir. 1950); Margosian v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464,
467 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), ANNOT. 4 AL.R.2d 1306 (1959); Prentiss v. National
Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 306, 312 (D.N.J. 1953); Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc.
v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960); See Vold, Strict Liability for
Aircraft Crashes and Federal Landings, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1953); Note, Torts
in Aeronautical Navigation, 19 TEMPLE L.Q. 496, 498 (1946).
1 Margosian v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1955).
The common law doctrine that an extraordinary hazard will subject the responsible person to absolute liability was infused into fault liability by Rylands
v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see generally Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H.
168, 97 A.2d 223 (1952).
3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) makes one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity liable to another whose person, land or chattel he injures
through his performance of the ultrahazardous activity. See Vold, Strict Liability
for Aircraft Crashes and Federal Landings, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1953).
" Margosian v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1955); ANNOT. 4 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1959).
4 Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup.
Ct. aff'd 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022) (1962). "[I1n light of the technical progress
achieved in the design construction, operation and maintenance of aircraft generally, . . . flying should no longer be deemed to be an ultrahazardous activity,
requiring the imposition of absolute liability for any damage or injury caused in
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that aviation is no longer ultrahazardous.' Thus regular negligence
principles apply.
C. Statutory Developments
The statutory framework relating to automobiles was thought not
to be applicable to aircraft,' perhaps because aviation had not developed to the extent of the automobile. Thus, legislation dealing
solely with aviation was enacted. In 1922, the Commission on Uni-

form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Aeronautics Act making
an aircraft owner absolutely liable for damages and stripping him
of all defenses.37 Probably because the Act was ahead of its time,

it was dropped from the active list of Uniform Laws at the National
Conference in 1945 ; accordingly the states began to look to concepts other than the rationale underlying the Uniform Act."
State statutes addressing the liability of non-negligent aircraft
the course thereof." Id. at 697. See Wolff, Liability of Aircraft Owners and Operators for Ground Injury, 24 J. Am L. & COM. 203 (1957); Note, Liability for
Ground Damage Caused by Aircraft-Trespass-Ultra-Hazardous Activity-Negligence, 28 J.AIR L. & COM. 315 (1961).
5 King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 964 (1950); D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Johnson v. Central Aviation, 103 Cal. App. 3d 102, 229 P.2d 114, 120 (1951); Boyd
v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Southern California Edison
Co. v. Coleman, 150 Cal. App. 829, 310 P.2d 504 (Super. Ct. 1957); Thraser
v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, 269 Ill. App. 502 (1933); Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service, (N.Y.)
1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 110; Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223
N.Y.S.2d, afl'd, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1962); Murphy v. Neely, 319 Pa. 437, 179
A. 439 (1935); Cf. Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 546, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
Incredibly, this view that aviation is ultrahazardous is still observed by the
American Law Institute, 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 520 (1938), Comment b.
See also Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970) wherein the court noted
that an airplane is a dangerous instrument thus making a non-negligent co-owner
liable to third persons for the negligence of the other co-owner.
161 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 4.02 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as KREINDLER] citing Moench & Romeo, Inc. v. Caton, 1 Av. Cas. 644 (Nassau
Co. Ct. N.Y. 1936).
37 11 U.L.A. § 5 (1922).
' Note, Torts in Aeronautical Navigation, 19 TEMPLE L.Q. 496 (1946).
31At the time the statute was enacted twenty-three states adopted it, but after
it was dropped from the active list the number of states keeping the Act dropped
to eighteen including: Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
But see United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 934 (1954) which quoted section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautic Act
and held for strict liability.
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owners for the operator's negligence have taken three basic forms.
The first"0 substantially follows the operation of aircraft definition in
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1 The second grouping makes
registration of the aircraft in the name of the owner prima facie
evidence that the owner was responsible for the conduct of the
operator at the time of the accident. ' The third type of statute
compels the aircraft owner to respond in damages when the operator acts with the express or implied permission of the owner thereby
resulting in the operator's liability. 3
Analysis of the diverse state remedies available to plantiffs reveal
the reasons why they desire to litigate in a federal forum. Plaintiff
attorneys contend that the multifarious state law, both decisional
and statutory, relating to an aircraft owner's liability has engendered inequities because of inconsistent recoveries in different
states. Thus plaintiffs have been attempting to persuade the federal
4'This

type of statute is found in

CONN. GEN.

CODE OF ALA. TIT.

REV. § 15-34(20)
REV. STAT. CH. 151/2, §

STAT.

(1966);

DEL.

4, § 20 (25) (1940);

CODE ANN.

TIT.

2 § 501

(1945); ILL.
22.11 (1965); IOWA CODE § 328.1(14)
(1946); Ky. REV. STAT. S 183.011 (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 6 § 3(24)
(1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 90, § 35(j) (1967); MINN. STAT. §
360.013(10) (1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-102(11) (1947); NEB. REV.
§ 3-101(11) (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 422:3(23) (1968); N.C.
§ 63-1(16) (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, § 2(20) (1972).
In Texas, the legislature deleted the last sentence of the Federal Aviation Act
definition of operator section from its definition of operation of aircraft. TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ART. 46c-l(a, i) (1969). See also Sosa v. Young Flying
Service, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
41
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 101(26), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970)
provides: "'Operation of aircraft' or 'operate aircraft' means the use of aircraft
for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation of aircraft. Any
person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without
the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessor or otherwise) of
the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the
meaning of this chapter."
42E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 1-4-3 (1956); cf. Rich v. Finley, 325 Mass.
99, 89 N.E.2d 213 (1949).
4 CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE § 21404 (West Supp. 1970) (§ 21404.1 was
added in 1968 to make the aircraft owner liable for a permittee pilot's negligence,
subject to limitations of 15,000 dollars for one person or 30,000 dollars for one
accident); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.180a (1967); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 251
(1968).
In addition, there are other statutes falling outside the bounds of these three
classifications that either require proof of negligence to hold the aircraft owner
liable, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 2-207 (1956); create a presumption of negligence,
MD. ANN. CODE ART. 1A § 9 (1957); or retain the absolute liability feature of
the Uniform Act for only forced landings, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 10-33 (Supp.
1971).
STAT.

GEN. STAT.
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courts to create a federal common law of aviation torts thereby
eliminating the diverse state laws by providing one uniform law of
recovery.
II. THE UTILITY OF A FEDERAL COMMON
LAW OF AVIATION TORTS

"The People repeatedly subjected,
like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more
inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the end
to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a
nervous breakdown.""
A. McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corporation'
In their desire to achieve a uniform law of recovery in air crash
litigation against the owners of aircraft via the federal common
law, plaintiffs have used various tactics. One recent method has
been to urge that the owner of the aircraft is vicariously liable for
the negligence of the operator because the definition of operation
of an aircraft under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ' includes
the owner. Therefore, since the owner is by definition operating
the airplane he should be held responsible in damages irrespective
of state law and the absence of an agency relationship.
In McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp.," two surviving passengers
brought a cause of action against the owner of a crashed aircraft
alleging that the pilot's negligence in operating the aircraft was
imputed to the owner under the definition of operator under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.4' Plaintiffs reasoned that the owner
of the aircraft had the most assets to reach and that as a matter of
public policy it would be convenient, logical and consistently evenhanded to impute the deceased pilot's negligence to the owner;
the owner had the "deeper pocket." The Tenth Circuit, relying on
44Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.

489 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
45450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
48 See note 41 supra.
47450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
4849

U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970), see note 41 supra.
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Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service,9 and Rosdail v. Western
Aviation, Inc." refused to imply a cause of action under the definitional section of the Federal Aviation Act; to use the federal common law to fashion a cause of action in tort subjecting aircraft
owners and
lessors to liability constitutes "abusive judicial law5
making." '
The triology of McCord, Rogers and Rosdail involve comparable
facts; in each case the plaintiffs made substantially the same arguments and the courts reached the same result, i.e., the federal common law cannot be relied upon to hold the owner of an aircraft
vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. The similarity,
however, ends here.
Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc.," the first case of the triology,
concerned the issue of whether the definitional section of the Federal Act raised an implied cause of action. Subsequently, the issue
in Rogers v. Ray GardnerFlying Service,"3 was whether the Federal
Aviation Act preempted state law. The Fifth Circuit in Rogers
used language relating to preemption, but cited Rosdail, a case concerned with implied cause of action, and thereby confused the
two notions. McCord also refused to extend the federal common
law to aviation torts, but added to the confusion by relying on both
Rogers and Rosdail by reasoning in terms of public policy. Consequently, while these three cases arrive at the same result, they
use seemingly disparate reasoning.
The delicate problems of federal-state relations demand that
,courts fully articulate the reasoning of their decisions and avoid the
great temptation to seize upon dicta and go beyond the reasons
for the earlier decisions. Hence, it is imperative for decisions to
reflect a true understanding of the federal system.
Apart from its deficiencies, however, the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in McCord is potentially significant in three ways: (i) it establishes
that federal aviation tort law will have to emanate from Congress
and not from the courts via "judicial inventiveness; '' "4(ii) it repre49435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
50297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
"450
"297
5"435
" Hill

F.2d at 1131 (emphasis supplied).
F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
at 1029 n.3 1.
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sents a desire to have the search for solvent defendants take place
in the state court systems rather than at the federal level, and (iii)
it reinforces the historical nature of the federal system that state
substantive solutions should be utilized when feasible."
Nevertheless, an improved method of analysis can be used. As
a general proposition, there should be a rebuttable presumption
that state law controls when there is a question of whether state or
federal law applies.
B. Proposal:Presumption in Favor of Applying State Law
1. Areas in which the Presumption Does Not Exist
Before analyzing the reasons for the presumption in favor of
applying state law, the threshold determination should be whether
the particular controversy falls into an area in which the presumption does not exist. These areas are primarily: (i) Congress delegating the lawmaking authority to the courts, (ii) national sovereignty dictating a nationwide solution, and (iii) the federal courts
exercising their traditional functions of the judiciary in formulating
remedies."
Of these areas the notion of Congressional delegation of the
lawmaking authority has been the most difficult for the courts to
grasp. Confusion arises because Congress rarely delegates its lawmaking power expressly." Unfortunately, the desire on the part of
the courts to create a federal common law has been so great that
whenever "Congress . ..has manifested, be it ever so lightly, an
intention to that end,"' courts have found this authorization. The
courts should look for meaningful evidence of Congressional intent
in the legislative history or statute." The court must look to affirmative and clear evidence before it can infer that Congress intended
to interfere with a state right by finding a federal cause of action."
I Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543, 545 (1954).

"Comment,

The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1519-20

(1969).
" Cf. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2071-75 (1970).

" Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 407 (1964).
59
Hill at 1038.
60Comment,
The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1525

(1969).
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The intent to create a federal cause of action has been implied

in two types of situations, jurisdictional statutes' and statutes that
preempt state law in certain areas.' Of the two, the second type of

statute has created more confusion. For example, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,"3 the Supreme Court held that section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 19474 empowered
the federal courts to fashion a federal common law of labor contracts, thereby preempting state law. Lincoln Mills is symptomatic
of the other opinions interpreting statutes that preempt state law.63
6 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) gives the federal judiciary jurisdiction of
maritime claims, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled." Contrast Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),
2674 (1970); Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ ll01(b)(1),
(c)(1) (1970); and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1970)
wherein Congress explicitly provided for state law to govern.
62 E.g., O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1940)
(Communications Act of 1934 preempts state law governing liability of a carrier
for transmission of a defamatory telegram).
8353 U.S. 448 (1957).
64 Labor Management Relations Act [Taft-Hartley Act] S 301, 29 U.S.C.

185 (1970).
65 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The analysis of the
Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills comes within the ill-defined "preemption doctrine." This doctrine is a judicially applied doctrine based on U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2-the supremacy clause- that elevates federal law above that of the states.
Swift & Co., Inc. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120 (1965). Traditionally, judicial
inquiry begins with a determination of whether Congress enacted the legislation
pursuant to a constitutionally delegated power. Then under the traditional analysis, the court considers various principles to determine whether Congress has
expressly or impliedly preempted the field of regulation in question. See Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-66 (1940). The situations in which the Congressional
declaration is either unequivocal or express that federal authority is exclusive
presents no problem. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961). The confusion arises in those situations in which Congress has neither explicitly prohibited dual regulation of federal and state nor unequivocally declared the exclusivity of federal authority that the confusion arises. Some of the frequently
but confusing articulated factors in the preemption doctrine are: (i) pervasive
federal scheme; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Services Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919), (ii) subject
matter requires uniform national standards; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957), (iii) state law impedes Congressional purpose; Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940), or (iv) compliance with federal and state
regulation is a physical impossibility; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d
1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), noted in 13 Bos. COL. IND. & C.L. REV. 813 (1972).
Contrast Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948); (Supreme Court
held that liability of interstate passengers traveling on free pass was to be determined without reference to state law) with Regents of the Univ. System v.
Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 594-602 (1950) (The Court held that even though the
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The Court groped for the slightest shred of evidence that Congress
intended for federal law to govern. Mr. Justice Douglas, in writing
for the majority even conceded that "[t]he legislative history of
[section] 301 is somewhat cloudy and confusing.""' But the Court's
appraisal of Congressional intent was neither justified by the
language of the statute nor the legislative history. 7 In enacting
section 301, Congress merely wished to allow the unions to sue in
states not normally according this privilege to unincorporated associations." Moreover, because this narrower view would not have
disturbed large portions of the law it should have been chosen.
Similar to Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,"8 other courts
have become misguided in the search for illusive legislative intent
and implied a cause of action from federal regulatory statutes. This
process began as early as 19167' with the conventional statutory
interpretation of looking to the text and history of the statute assisting the courts."' Apart from this traditional form of analysis,
however, two distinct theories have evolved to justify the implication of a cause of action; either the statute sets an express standard
of conduct or provides evidence of a standard within the framework
of an existing cause of action," or else the statute declares certain
Federal Communications Commission had authority to regulate radio license
transfers, construction of contracts transferring radio stations or its property is
governed by state law.) In Francis, the Court failed to inquire into Congressional
intent. In addition, it is unrealistic to argue in that situation that the federal
regulatory scheme would be hampered by the application of the state law. In
Regents, on the other hand, the Court made a careful inquiry into Congressional
intent to preempt. See Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate
Rules Remedies of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1090-91 (1964).
353 U.S. at 452.

67353 U.S. at 461 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion).See also Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HAgv. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957).
08 Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The

Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1957).
69353 U.S. 448 (1957).
70Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916); Note, Implying Civil
Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963).
71 Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 285, 289 (1963).
72 Id. at 286. This view is more frequently seen in negligence actions. See
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
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behavior to be unlawful, necessitating the creation of a new cause
of action to give meaning to the statute."
These theories are benchmarks at best and the cases cannot be
categorized easily. For example, there is a split of authority with
respect to whether to imply a private cause of action under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958."' Some of the reasons the courts
have used to imply the cause of action under the Federal Aviation
Act include public policy, lack of adequate state or administrative
remedy and the criminal sanctions create civil liability. In Fitzgerald
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc." the Second Circuit reasoned
that violation of the criminal sanctions in the Act gave rise to civil
liability as well. But in Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.," a case not involving violation of a criminal sanction, the
federal district court allowed the implied cause of action citing
Fitzgerald as authority. Since the controlling factor in Fitzgerald
enabling the court to imply the cause of action was the violation
of the criminal part of the statute, it was improper for the court in
Town of East Haven to extend Fitzgerald beyond its intended
meaning. Sosa v. Young Flying Service7 also implied a cause of
11This second theory allows greater judicial power since no closely related
duty is required. Id.
' Cases that have found reasons to imply civil remedies: Fitzgerald v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956); Hays v. Morgan,
221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 282
F. Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968); Sosa v. Young Flying Service, 277 F. Supp. 554
(S.D. Tex. 1967); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.
Cal. 1961); Cf. Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F. Supp.
456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622
(1957); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
Cases that have not found an implied cause of action are: McCord v. Dixie
Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1130 (10th Cir. 1971); Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, Inc., 437 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying
Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969); Yelinek v.
Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brant, 250 F. Supp. 445
(W.D. Wis. 1966); Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 42 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961); Mozingo v.Consolidated Construction Co., 171 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.
Va. 1959); Mittleman v. Seifert, 17 Cal. App. 3d 51, 94 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1971);
Nachsin v. De La Bretonne, 17 Cal. App. 3d 637, 95 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971);
McEntire v. Estate of Forte, 463 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Southeastern
Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962), appeal dismissed,
371 U.S. 21 (1962).
75229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
76282 F. Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968).
17277
F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
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action under the Act, yet the opinion is devoid of reasoning or
analysis. Thus the courts show a lack of direction. While both
Neiwonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.tm and Fitzgerald allow-

ed a private cause of action, Moungey v. Brandt' a suit for injuries sustained in an aircraft collision denied it and directly repudiated Neiswonger and Fitzgerald. The Moungey court declared

that the broad implication doctrine was unneeded and unfounded.
A second area in which the reasons for the presumption do not
exist is when national sovereignity dictates a nation-wide solution.
For example, it is essential to the federal union that disputes
among the states be settled. Thus controversies regarding apportionment of interstate water,"' validity and construction of interstate
compacts" or interstate boundary disputes"' have been adjudged
appropriate in a federal forum. In addition, the federal judiciary is
singularly qualified to settle those situations when the United States
must act in a unified fashion for international purposes.' In these
situations, state solutions to the problems are totally inappropriate
and constitutionally improper."
Finally, the third area in which the reasons for the presumption
do not exist is when the federal judiciary exercises the traditional
judicial function of formulating remedies. In this situation the main
concern is providing remedial law repairing the breaches of federal
duties. Also, the sovereign has a strong interest in having federal
remedies apply consistently from state to state.
In this area two distinct functions of the federal courts have
evolved. The courts have created remedies when the basic statute
does not so provide" and further developed already existing reme35 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1929).
78250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
78

v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
82
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
109-10 (1938) (dictum).
88 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
1 Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1520
(1969).
83J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private cause of action
from a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Fitzgerald v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956) (private cause
88Connecticut
81West

of action from violation of Federal Aviation Act of 1958); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (private cause of action for violation

of federal law against intercepting and divulging telephone messages).
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dies.8" Confusion has resulted because the courts and commentators

have mistakenly labeled both situations as raising an "implied cause
of action.""7 The need for a logical rationale in the area of the
federal common law should not be obscured by mistaken reliance

on labels.
2. Reasons for the Presumption

One reason for this presumption is that the federal common law
should not override policies important to a state. " Examples of
areas in which states have particularly strong policies are family
relationships,89 property law 0 and torts.' When there is a danger
that federal law will conflict with these strong and traditional state
policies then the presumption in favor of applying state law is
strongest.
A second reason is that there are innate advantages to state-by-

state solution of areas of controversy. The state solutions can closely
match the problems that are particularly unique to local con-

ditions. 9 Third, the historic nature of the federal system requires
the application of state solutions when feasible."' Since the central
government is one of limited and delegated powers then the generality of power is entrusted to the states' and should remain there.
Homberg v.Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
note 56 supra. See also Note, Implying Civil Actions from Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1965).
" Miskin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797,
812 (1957); Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512,
1518 (1969).
"' United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); Cf. HART & WECHSLER 1013-18.
90State law governs in the following situations: United States v. Brosnan,
363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960) (foreclosure proceedings extinguishing federal tax lien);
Straton v.New, 282 U.S. 318 (1931) (bankruptcy rights); United States v. Fox,
94 U.S. 315 (1876) (purchases of real estate by the United States); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.United States, 329 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1964), vacated as moot, 381
U.S. 413 (1965) (government contract extinguishing a servitude on mineral
rights); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956) (efficacy of a
Farmer's Home Administration lien as against a bona fide purchaser).
91McCord v.Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
11 Cf. Note, Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1128 (1969).
13Wechsler, The Poltical Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543, 545 (1954).
"49 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 199-200 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
87See
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3. Overriding the Presumption
In this proposed method of analysis, if the court concludes that
there is adequate justification and clear and affirmative evidence to
override the presumption, then the federal court could apply the
federal common law. Three main considerations that would best
justify the rebutting of the presumption are: (i) the need for a
uniform rule instead of the diverse state rules; (ii) the need for
encouragement of federal policies; and (iii) protection of federal
policies from interference by the states.
The need for a uniform federal rule instead of the various state
rules is frequently proffered in arguing for a federal common law.'
There are two aspects to the promotion of uniformity. First, in
certain situations there is a need for a federal law having the same
meaning in each of the states.96 Although this need is important, it
is not a talisman; courts should look for additional justifications to
promote a uniform federal rule." Second, there is a need for a
uniform federal rule enabling the federal government to efficiently
administer its activities. If inconvenience to the federal government is to be avoided, then the national government should
administer its activities from one source rather than looking at the
laws of the fifty states.9" The need for avoiding federal inconvenience
11Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty: Problems of Federalism, Tempests and Teapots, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 16-17 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Craig and Alexander]; cf. Note, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction
and Aircraft Accident Cases: Hops, Skips and Jumps Into Admiralty, 38 J. AIR
L. & COM. 53, 62-65 (1972).
9Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943)
(interpreting the meaning
of the word "felony" with reference to the Federal Bank Robbery Act by using
federal common law); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952)
(FELA); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (government
checks); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (Jones Act);
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (Sherman Antitrust
Act); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) (National Bank Act); see also
note 76 supra.

"In differing contexts the need for uniformity may be so pressing that sole
responsibility for establishing it, or for working out the context of the needed
regulation, cannot feasibly be entrusted to a legislature." Hart 530.
" Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930) (federal income tax refunds and
inheritance ownership is determined by state law). See generally Cahn, Local
Law in Federal Taxation, 52

YALE

L.J. 799 (1943).

"8Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (need for
uniform federal common law rule because of pervasive nature of federal commercial paper) but see text at note 121 infra; United States v. Chester Park Apts.,
Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1964)

(federal common law controlled since some

states held illegal the large scale mortgage of the government).
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also appears to be overstated."
Occasionally, the courts have become infatuated with uniform0
ity " absent adequate justification.1 If the two aspects to the promotion of uniformity are not present, then there should be an
affirmative legislative justification for the court to fashion a uniform
federal rule; otherwise there is a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine and the federal judiciary is exceeding its intended
historical function. The better approach, however, is to resist the

alluring temptation for uniformity simply for uniformity's sake."'
Just as the importance of uniformity is overstated in many cases,
likewise the attainability of uniformity is often ignored."' The ob-

stacles to decisional uniformity are formidable. For example, just
as the state court decisions are not binding outside the state, within
the federal system, decisions of the federal district courts are not
binding on each other."' In addition, while the circuit court opinions
are binding upon the federal district courts within the respective
circuits," they are not binding upon the other circuits.' Moreover,
some state courts treat the federal court rulings as binding and thus
will follow its interpretation of the federal common law," but

others may not." To further add to the potential lack of uniformity
in a federal decisional rule, state courts are not bound by the interpretation of the local circuits.1" These problems cannot be feasibly

solved by the Supreme Court, which lacks the time and resources
to erect common law principles in every situation.'"
9Many commentators would argue to the contrary, see, e.g., Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins; The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L.
REV. 966, 970 (1966).
100
E.g., McKenna v. Wallis, 344 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd sub nom.
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
101E.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956). See Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1084, 1092 (1964).
101United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-55, 357 (1966).
1
00 See note 97 supra at 813.
14 E.g., Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
105E.g., Matter of S.T. Foods, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
106E.g., Burton v. United States, 272 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1960).
107
E.g., Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 Ala. 211, 160 So. 530
(1935).
08See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Brown v. Palmer Clay Prods. Co., 290 Mass. 108, 195 N.E. 122
(1935).
'IQComment, The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALBANY
L. REV. 73, 75 (1963).
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Even assuming that the choice can be made in favor of a uniform
federal rule instead of the diverse state rules the problem is not
ended. Will parallel or partially parallel remedies continue to be
available under the state law? 11 Also, even if parallel judicial remedies are permitted, complicated questions of jurisdiction and procedure arise if the1 2 state court remedy is sought to be enforced in
the federal court.
Despite these problems associated with attaining uniformity of
law, the trend continues toward uniformity.'13 It is hoped that the
courts will begin to at least articulate fully their reasoning in casting
the selection in favor of federal or state law to reflect the deliberation and rationale choice.1"
The second consideration rebutting the presumption is the need
for the encouragement of federal policies. The only logical forum to
litigate any controversy regarding federal policies is the federal
system." ' Assuming the Congress has properly authorized the courts
to further a federal policy without violating the strictures of the
separation of powers doctrine, federal judges will probably allow
11 See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters, C & H. Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S.
485, 500 (1953).
' E.g., Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), noted in 65 HARV. L. REV. 1443 (1952).
I" See note 96 supra. See also Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962); Note, 50 TExAS L. REv. 183, 195 (1971).
114See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960); Board of Comm'rs
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); see also United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,
328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328
U.S. 152, 175-76 (1946); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289
(1940).
"Whatever lack of uniformity this [decision] may produce between . . . different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within
limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging
from those of its neighbors." Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313
U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (Reed, J.).
The typical argument for a federal common law of aviation torts results because of the alleged inequities resulting from various state laws. For example,
New York allows unlimited recovery in wrongful death cases, while Massachusetts
limits recovery to $15,000. Moreover, the cases arising out of New York have
shown deliberate favoritism to New York residents. This problem is explored in
Keeffe & DeValerio, Dallas, Dred Scott and Eyrie Erie, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM.
107, 123 (1972). See also Kennedy, Counterclaims, Cross-claims and Impleader
in Federal Aviation Litigation, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 325 (1972) for problems relating to contribution and idemnity under non-uniform state laws.
115See Miskin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLtUM. L.

REV. 157, 158 (1953).
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the government to pursue its objectives on a broader scale than
would state court judges."' In addition, a more sympathetic reception of federal policies will occur in the federal judiciary."' Unfortunately, the courts have become confused between the need to encourage a federal policy and overriding state law simply because the
United States is a party to the lawsuit.11 There is a clear distinction
between the two situations and the courts should avoid being mis119
led.
The third consideration justifying overriding state law is the need
to protect federal policies from interference by the states. Obviously,
if state courts have the responsibility for furthering federal policy
in appropriate situations, then there is a strong likelihood that undesirable conflicts could arise thereby impeding federal policy.
Thus, the alternative is to rely on the federal judiciary.'
4. Distinguished Mere Presence of Federal Government
The presumption in favor of applying state law is rebutted when
Congress delegates the lawmaking power to the judiciary.' Since
in every situation of this type there is a federal statute in the area,
an easy mistake would be to develop a federal common law simply
because of the presence of the federal government. " This mistake
was made in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States "' when the Supreme Court held that the rights and duties of the United States
with respect to commercial paper are governed by the federal common law. Although the Court stated that since the authority of the
United States to issue checks is not governed by state law then
neither should state law govern the rights and duties arising out of
the issuance. While the main basis of the decision was the presence
of the federal government,"' the Court did not explain why the
116
Id.
117
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INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-

40 (tent. Draft No. 4, April 25, 1966).
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United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) is an example of the Court
properly drawing this distinction. But see United States v. 93,970 Acres of Land,
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

360 U.S. 328 (1959).
11 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
120 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
121See text at note 57 supra.
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United States should be treated different from any other drawee
in the various states.

Typically, the justification for this approach is the unique competence of the federal judiciary to declare the governing law for
problems that bear a substantial relation to the federal government." But the mere presence of the federal government is simply
a rationalization rather than a reason why federal law should displace state law."' This analysis loses sight of the historical basis of
the federal system, i.e., all federal actions are taken interstitially and
against the background of the existing state law."
III. CONCLUSION

"[T]he tendency of the law must
always be to narrow the field of
8
uncertainty.'

2

In aviation tort litigation cogent analysis, providing a clear
method to determine whether state law should apply, is necessary.
First, the court should make a determination with respect to
whether the controversy is in an area in which the presumption does
not exist. The presumption would be absent for aviation tort suits
if Congress had delegated its lawmaking authority to the federal
judiciary. The Federal Aviation Act, however, does not furnish any
affirmative evidence of intent to displace state law, and the contrary
is expressly stated."' Since the Act is not a jurisdictional statute,
nor does it preempt state law, it does not fall within either of the
two types of statutes that can be said to imply a Congressional
judgment that the federal common law should apply. To hold otherwise requires clear and convincing evidence of a Congressional
judgment;' this evidence does not exist.
Second, national sovereignty does not dictate a nationwide
solution. In aviation tort litigation there is no dispute among the
"' Miskin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799
(1957).
"I Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1527
(1969).
1'

Hart & Wechsler 435.

"8O.W. HOLMES,

THE COMMON LAW

127 (1881).

"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1106, 49 U.S.C. S 1506 (1970).
"' Hill 1038.
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states nor is there a need for the United States to act in a unified
fashion for international purposes.
Third, the Federal Aviation Act does not create any federal tort
duties requiring the federal judiciary to formulate federal remedies.
The duties arising out of tort litigation have been traditionally
established by the state, thus the remedies should be formulated in
the state judicial system.
If a court concludes that the controversy does not fall within the
areas wherein the reasons for the presumption are absent, then the
court should presume state law applies. This presumption is reasonable because state law traditionally governs tort suits. Then the
court should look to those reasons that would justify the overriding
the presumption; of the three reasons, the need for a uniform tort
law in aviation litigation is the most persuasive factor. Although
the need for a uniform aviation tort liability law is frequently
urged,'81 this is inadequate to justify the federal courts to fashion a
federal common law. First, there is no federal law, except for the
Federal Tort Claims Act,"2 concerned with tort litigation that needs
to have uniform interpretation in the states. Plaintiffs in the triology of McCord, Rogers and Rosdail urged that the definition of
operation of aircraft of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is the
vehicle to fashion a federal common law."" The Act, particularly
the definitional sections," does not apply to tort litigation. Second,
in aviation torts there is no need for a uniform rule enabling the
federal government to administer its activities. Whether the litigation is in the federal or state forum would not affect the administration of the federal government. Third, the state's interest in
litigating tort suits is not outweighed by any federal interest in
having all aviation claims uniformly settled.
Plaintiffs who continue to argue that there can be no justice emanating from the diverse state remedies should seek relief from Congress in the form of a federal aviation act. Regardless of the advantages of a Congressionally legislated solution, as a practical matter,
"' See note 95 supra.

1-128 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).

"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 101(26), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26)
see note 41 supra.
" Craig & Alexander 39.
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it does not appear that Congress will provide that legislation soon."
Until that day, however, plaintiffs will have to be satisfied with the
state remedies. The imagination and intelligence needed to achieve
the goal of fair compensation to aircraft crash victims and equitable
allocation of the cost to the industry-a goal of substantive law in
air crash litigation-should not be enervated by assumptions concerning the value of doctrinal uniformity. Rather, these qualities
imply a discernment to see that a solution is consistent with the
underpinnings of the federal system, while at the same time producing substantive law that will produce the best possible compensation and risk allocation. With respect to aviation tort litigation,
"abusive judicial lawmaking" and "judicial inventiveness" do not
provide the answer.

"See Note, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction and Aircraft Accident Cases: Hops,
Skips and Jumps Into Admiralty, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 53, 63 n.64 (1972).

